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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XVII APRIL, I932 NUMBER 3
A STUDY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE*
A. CHALMERS MOLE and LYMAN P. WILSONj
I. GENERAL STATEMENT
No field of torts offers better illustration of the lack of efficacy of a
rule of thumb than is found in the doctrine of contributory negligence.
It is, indeed, a high-sounding phrase which announces that no man
shall be permitted to base his recovery upon his own fault, and the
high moral tone of the statement gains for it such an immediate and
complete acquiescence that it at once becomes difficult to realize that
injustice may flow from it. Yet, if the signs of the times mean any-
thing, there is a growing feeling that injustice is being worked and
that there are situations in which the plaintiff should not be denied a
recovery merely because his own fault has to some appreciable degree
contributed to his harm. There has been an increasing appreciation
that, where the fault of the plaintiff has been slight in comparison
with the fault of the defendant, justice may best be done by per-
mitting the plaintiff to recover some compensation for his hurt, and
that it is unjust to allow the truly culpable defendant to wholly
escape the evil consequences of his acts. So we may well question the
desirability of the rule of Butterfield v. Forrester' and the much quoted
case of Tuff v. Warman.2  The few common-law jurisdictions in
which the rule has been questioned have invoked the principle which
is the subject of investigation in this article. In these jurisdictions we
find the courts making much of the terms "slight", "ordinary" and
"gross" negligence, and making comparisons of negligence by de-
termining whether the negligence of the respective parties was slight,
ordinary or gross in the technical and legal sense of these terms, and
then making a sort of mathematical comparison of the degree in
*Copyright, 1932, by A. Chalmers Mole and Lyman P. Wilson. Because of its
necessary length, this study will be printed in two instalments, the concluding
instalment to appear in the June issue.
fThe authors are, respectively, a third year student and a Professor of Law in
the Cornell Law School.
'xi East 6o (18o9).
22 C. B. N. S. 470 (1857), aft'd, 5 C. B. N. S. 573 (1857).
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which one has been negligent with the degree of negligence displayed
by the other. The absurdity of any attempt to introduce mathe-
matical exactness into the uncertain and shifting problems of negli-
gence needs no exposition.
The attitude of the courts and of commentators with respect to
degrees of negligence has been unsatisfactory and at times slipshod
and there is active complaint about the use of these terms. For
example, we find Thompson3 saying: "Lord Holt, C. j., in a cele-
brated case,4 divided negligence into three degrees, slight, ordinary
and gross. In this he is supposed to have made an attempt to follow
the Roman law, but later investigators have pointed out that culpa
levissima, or slight negligence, was unknown to the Roman law, but
was one of the refinements of the Middle Ages.5 I confess myself
careless, ignorant and indifferent upon this whole subject of the
degrees of negligence. It is plain that such refinements can have no
useful place in the practical administration of justice. Negligence
cannot be divided into three compartments by mathematical lines."
Baron Rolfe, in Wilson v. Brett,' states that "[t]here is no legal differ-
ence between negligence and gross negligence; it is the same thing
with the addition of a vituperative epithet, and the question in any
case is whether there was culpable negligence." Again, in Perkins v.
New York Central Railroad Company,7 the Court of Appeals of New
York said, "the difficulty of defining gross negligence, and the in-
trinsic uncertainty pertaining to the question as one of law, and the
other [utter] impracticability of establishing any precise rule on the
subject, renders it unsafe to base any legal decision on distinctions
of the degrees of negligence. Certainly before cases are made to
turn by the verdict of juries, upon any such distinction, the judges
should be able to define, with some precision, what they mean by
gross negligence, slight negligence and ordinary negligence. It will be
seen on examining the many cases reported, where the question has
arisen, that this has been found utterly impracticable by the judges,
when called upon to instruct juries on the question .... Negligence is
essentially always a question of fact, and every case depends neces-
sarily upon its own particular circumstances. What is negligent in a
given case, may easily be affirmed by a jury; but in what degree the
negligence consists, in any scale of classification of degrees of negli-
31 THOmPsoN, NEGLIGSNCE (2d ed. goi) § I8.
'Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (1703).
sSupra note 3, § 18, citingWARToN, NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 1878) §§ 59-63, and
acknowledging indebtedness to author of article in (1895) i N. Y. L. Rav. No. I.
611 M. &W. 113, I'5 (1843).
724 N. Y. x96, 207 (1862).
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gence, is not so easily determined-will ordinarily be a matter of pure
speculation and of no practical consequence."
On the other hand, Illinois, for a number of years, applied and
staunchly defended the rule of comparative negligence.9 In Central
Military Tract Railroad Company v. Rockafellow,'0 the court states,
referring approvingly to Chicago & Mississippi Railroad Company v.
Patchin," "the degrees of care or diligence are three, and are well
defined and illustrated in Story [and] Jones on Bailments. Negligence
is similarly divided, and made or defined to be the counterparts or
opposites of each degree. There is little difficulty in laying down the
rule for care and for neglect, while we are content to state in the lan-
guage long known, familiar to, and used by the courts and profession.
The difficulty is very little greater in determining what degree of each
is applicable to any given state of facts. The great difficulty is the
application of the rule to determine whether the particular facts
show the want of the ascertained degree of care, or the guiltiness
of the negligence applicable to the relation of the parties under the
circumstances." The Illinois court in 1865 said, "negligence is
relative, and the plaintiff, although guilty of negligence which may
have contributed to the injury, may hold the defendant liable if
he has been guilty of a greater degree of negligence. The fact that
the plaintiff is guilty of slight negligence does not absolve the de-
fendant from the use of care and the use of reasonable efforts to
avoid the injury.' 2 Until 1885 the Illinois court upheld the doctrine
that in proportion to the negligence of the defendant should be
measured the degree of care required of the plaintiff-that is, the
greater the negligence manifested by defendant, the less degree of
care will be required of the plaintiff to recover; that "the degrees
of negligence must be measured and considered, and wherever it shall
appear that the plaintiff's negligence is comparatively slight, and
that of the defendant gross, he shall not be deprived of his action."'u
sIn Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 646 (1842), Lord Denman says, at 661, "It may
well be doubted whether between "gross negligence" and negligence merely, any
intelligible distinction exists." Judge Curtis, in Steamboat New World v. King,
16 How. 472, 474 (U. S. 1853) says, "it may be doubted whether these terms
["slight", "ordinary" and "gross"] can be usefully applied in practice."
'Explanation of the doctrine, 2o R. C. L. § 119, 120; 45 C. J. IO36; 6 AM. &
ENG. ENCY. 36o; BOUVIER, LAW DIcTIoNARY (Century ed.), "Negligence"; cf.
infra notes xi-i3; FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LiABLITY Acr, infra note 13.
"17 Ill. 541, 550 (1855). nx6 Ill. I98 (1854).
"2St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. R. v. Todd, 36 Ill. 409, 414 (1865).
"Galena & Chic. Union R. R. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858); C. B. & Q. R. R. v.
Payne, 59 Ill. 534 (1871); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Feehan, 149 IIl. 202
(1893); Chic. B. & Q. R. R. v. Hazzard, 26 Ill. 373 (186i) Schmidt v. C. & N. Ry.,
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On February 1g, i93o, a bill to amend the local Civil Practice Act
was introduced in the New York Assembly, which, if enacted, would
have introduced the doctrine of comparative negligence into the law
of this state. The proposed bill, which was killed in committee,
applied to damages in personal injury and death cases and cases for
injury to property arising from negligence. Itslanguagewas as follows:
"In all actions hereafter brought either at common law or
pursuant to any statute general or special to recover damages
resulting from negligence for personal injury or where such
injuries have resulted in death, or for injury to property, the fact
that the person injured, or the owner of the property, or person
having control over the property may have been guilty of con-
tributory negligence, where that question may by law be liti-
gated, shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be diminished
by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attrib-
utable to the person injured, or to the owner of the property, or
the person having control over the property."
Although the bill did not provide for recognition of degrees of
negligence in New York, it did provide for a measuring and a com-
parison of the negligences of the parties, and an apportioning of the
damages, and clearly would have involved the whole problem of com-
parative negligence.
Referring to the history of the law of negligence, one notes that the
common-law rule for negligent injury,14 which prevails in England
and in all but a few American jurisdictions, has never taken into
account the relative degree in which each of the parties may be
shown to have been responsible for the injury. If the plaintiff can be
said to have been at faultin any appreciable degree, he has beenpre-
cluded from recovery, and contributory negligence forms a complete
defense to an action to recover damages for injuries thus inflicted. 5
83 Ill. 405 (x876); Stratton v. Central City Horse Ry., 95 In. 25 (x88o); St. Louis,
A. & T. H. R. R. v. Todd, supra note I2; Garfield Mfg. Co. v. McLean, 18 In.
App. 447 (x886); C. & N. W. Ry. v. Des Lauriers, 40 I. App. 654 (i89o); L. N. A.
& C. Ry. v. Johnson, 44 Ill. App. 56 (189i). Doctrine overruled in Illinois:
Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 Ill. 358 (1885); City of Lanark v. Dough-
erty, 153 Ill. 163,38 N. E. 892 (r894); Penn. Coal Co. v. Kelly, 156 Ill. 9,41 N. E.
620 (1895); Cicero St. Ry. v. Meixner, i6o Ill. 320, 43 N. . 823 (z896); L. S. &
M. S. Ry. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546, 37 N. E. 905 (1894); C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Maxwell, 59 Ill. App. 673 (1895). Cf. TEE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LuBmrrY AcT,
35 STAT. 66 (I908), 45 U. S. C. § 53 (1926).
"Coimmon-law rule originated in Butterfield v. Forrester, supra note i. Col-
lection of Cases in SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE (6th ed. 1913) § 61, p.
146; COOLEY, TORTS (3d ed. x9o6) 1438; 29 CYc. 505-6; 2o R. C. L. 99.
'545 C. J. 1037. Cf. note 7, at p. 1037, containing list of cases from jurisdictions
expressly repudiating the doctrine of comparative negligence.
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Under the civil law, the principle generally obtains that, where
both parties have been guilty of negligence which contributed to the
injury, both must share responsibility, and the plaintiff may recover a
proportion of the damages suffered varying inversely according to the
negligence attributable to him. Justinian's Digest,8 followed by
various Civil Codes, provided that one party chargeable with an
accident should assume damages in proportion to his fault; where
the proportion is not ascertainable, the damages should be equally
divided between the parties. Switzerland's Code of Obligations'o
and Spain's Civil Codelb authorize the use of the doctrine of com-
parative negligence and proportional damages; Portugal'", Persias",
Austria16 and Germany1O, under their respective codes, make lia-
bility depend upon whether the injury has been caused mainly by one
party or the other, with the provision that damages are to be ap-
portioned according to the respective negligences of the parties in-
volved. The Canadian Provinces of Ontario and Quebec'7 hold that
plaintiff's contributory negligence does not exonerate defendant
whose negligence was the immediate cause of the accident; under the
Ontario Negligence Act of '93o,17a "each shall be liable to make
JusTINL&N, DIG. 1, XVII, 203; DIG. Boox 5o, tit. 17, RULE 203.1kART. 51, SWITZERLAND CODE OF OBLIGATIONS. Cf. Rakes v. Atl. Gulf &
Pac. Co., infra note i8b.
UbCONTRADICTIONS, ART. 1902 Of CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN authorizes use of the
comparative negligence doctrine; but see xO2 Jum. Crv., disallowing recovery to
contributorily negligent plaintiff; see 76 JuR. Civ. No. 134.
IMCART. 2398, § 2, CODE OF PORTUGAL, providing that in case of negligence or
fault on the part of the injured, indemnity shall be reduced, and if on part of an-
other, it shall be apportioned. 16dPERSIAN CODE, ARTS. 2199, 2202.
IleCivIM CODES AUSTRIA, ART. 1304, allowing proportional damages according
to the degree of fault of respective parties.
16fGERMAN CIv. CODE, ART. 254, making liability depend on whether injury was
caused mainly by one party or the other.
17LA REVUE DE JURISPRUDENCE, vol. 6, p. go, defendant entitled to reduction of
damages rather than exonerated, where defendant's negligence had been an im-
mediate cause of the accident. Montreal Tramways v. McAllister, 26 Que.
K. B. 174,34 D. L. R. 565 (r9z6), and see New York case based upon McAllister
case, Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N. Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112, 68 A. L. R.
801 (1929); Boilard v. Nault, 36 Que. K. B. 572 (1923); Jess v. Quebec & L.
Ferry Co., 25 Que. Super. 224 (i9o4); Hunt v. Wilson, 15 Que. Super. 355 (r899);
Davignon v. Corp. of Stanbridge Sta., i4 Que. Super. 1i6 (1898); Fortier v.
Lauzier, I4 Que. Super. 359 (1898); Nichols Chem. Co. v. Lefebvre, 42 Can. Sup.
Ct. 402 (i909); Royal El. Co. v. Heve, 32 Can. Sup. Ct. 462 (I9O2); Pacquet v.
Dufour, 39 Can. Sup. Ct. 332 (1907); Stanley v. Nat'l Fruit Co., [1931] I D. L.
R. 3o6; Chambers v. Sampson, [1931] 2 D. L. R. 206.
17aNEGLIGENcE ACT OF ONTARIO (1930) c. 27; cf. Mara v. Hartley, [1931] 3
D. L. R. 734.
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contribution and indemnify each other in the degree in which they are
respectively found to be at fault or negligent." In France,' con-
tributory negligence on the part of an injured plaintiff has the effect
only of reducing damages recoverable. Both Porto Rico'sa and the
Philippines'sb hold that, unless it were the immediate cause of the ac-
cident, plaintiff's negligence merely reduces damages; each party is
chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault. Thus it is seen
that the majority of civil law jurisdictions never recognized the com-
mon-law doctrine of contributory negligence, although among them
there appears to be a conflict of authority as to the recognition of
degrees of negligence. Louisiana,19 however, has adopted the common-
law majority rule concerning negligence, and does not apportion
the damages.
These widely divergent views have led to the conviction that
profit is to be found in a detailed study of the various attempts which
have been made to modify the rigors of the common-law doctrine of
contributory negligence.
18Contributory negligence has effect of reducing damages only. See Case of
Marquant, Aug. 20, 1879; Case of Laugier, Nov. II, 1896; FuZiER-HERmAN,
TITLE RESPONSIBILITE CIVILE, 4'1, 412; DALLOZ (Vol. 18, 1896) TITLE TRAVAIL
363,364 and (Vol. 15, 1895) TITLE REsPONsIBILITE, 193, 198; see also, concerning
French, German and Civil Law generally, BEAUDRY LANcANTERIE, PRECIS Du
DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS, No. 2881; SCHUSTER, PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN
PRIVATE LAW (1907) 383; 2 SHERMAN, MODERN ROMAN LAW (1917) 383; BUR-
GERLICHES GESETZBUCH (GER. CIV. CODE) 254 (2).
iSaIn order to bar plaintiff, his negligence must be 'one of the determining causes
of the principal accident', Ubeda y Salazar v. San Juan Light & T. Co., 4 Porto
Rico Fed. Rep. 533 (i909). As to contributory negligence under the EMPLOYERS'
LIABILITY ACT OF PORTO RIco, see Vargas v. Am. R. R., I Porto Rico Fed. Rep.
292 (i9o3); Bosakowski v. Am. R. R., I Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 277 (i9o3); Diaz v.
FajardoDev. Co., 2 Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 152 (i9o6); Martinez v. Brown Co., 6
Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 405 (1913).
lSbRakes v, Atl. Gulf & Pac. Co., 7 Ph. 359 (1907); Del Prado v. Manila El. Co.,
52 Ph. 9oo (1929). Under CIVIL CODE, ART. 1103, contributory negligence is not a
complete defense: Cerezo v. AtI. Gulf & Pac. Co., 33 Ph. 425 (i916); Taylor v.
Manila, El. R. R. & L. Co., 16 Ph. 8 (191o); Mestres v. Manila, El. R. R. &
L. Co., 32 Ph. 496 (1915). Doctrine of comparative negligence applies in actions
under the EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT of 1874: Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Ph. 953
(1916).
'
9
"The doctrine of comparative negligence has never obtained in Louisiana,"
WILKERSON, PERSONAL INJURIES 64, § 65; Knight v. Pontchartrain R. R., 23 La.
Ann. 462 (1871); Johnson v. Canal & C. R. R., 27 La. Ann. 53 (1875); Belle
Alliance Co. v. Texas & P. Ry., 125 La. 777,51 So. 846 (i9io); Mathes v. Schwing,
169 La. 272, II9 So. 577 (I929). But note, THE REVISED CIVIL CODE recognizes
three degrees of negligence, slight, ordinary and gross, infra notes 182-184, 193-
201.
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II. THE RULE IN ADMIRALTY
Courts of admiralty early showed their displeasure over the practi-
cal working of the common-law rule of contributory negligence, and,
desiring to overcome the obvious hardships that arose from its appli-
cation, formulated more just rules for determining who should bear
the loss. The present discussion will deal chiefly with cases of collision
between two ships, touching only incidentally on cases of personal
tort or of tort arising from contract in the field of admiralty.
It is not the province of this discussion to argue the desirability of
adoption of the rule of proportionate damages, with an eye to bring-
ing the United States into conformity with major shipping nations
of the world on the subject of collision, but rather to show the simi-
larity between the rules of admiralty and the doctrine of comparative
negligence. The primary object is to indicate that as fairness and
justice have been approximated in admiralty by more lenient rules of
apportioning the damage where both parties have been guilty of fault,
so also is it possible that the courts of common law may find it de-
sirable to adopt the more lenient rule of comparative negligence.
Two rules to determine on which party the loss, or the greater
part of the loss, should fall are now in use.20 The United States
Courts of Admiralty apply the rule of equal "division of loss", which
provides that, where two ships have collided and both are guilty of
fault in some degree, the total damage is to be assessed and each
party is to pay one-half of the sum. The rule is applied only where
both parties are clearly at fault, or in cases of so-called "inscrutable
fault".21 All other leading shipping nations have adopted the rule of
20See an excellent article on the subject, Franck, Collisions at Sea in Relation to
International Maritime Law (1896) 12 L. Q. REv. 260. M. Louis Franck, Ad-
vocate in Antwerp, Professor of Maritime Law at Brussels, Pres. International
Maritime Committee, states clearly and concisely the several rules of damages
operative in Admiralty Courts, and compares the relative value of the rules. See
also an article by him in (1926) 42 L. Q. Rxv. 25 as to the advance made since
1896 as concerns the proportionate rule. The authors wish to acknowledge
indebtedness to Professor George C. Sprague for his excellent article on Divided
Damages in (1929) 6 N. Y. U. L. REV. I5; see infra note 72.
21There is a marked distinction between "inevitable accident" and "inscrutable
fault". Only three cases of "inscrutable fault" are to be found in the United
States reports, the last occurring in 1872. Where the court is satisfied that both
vessels are at fault, but is uncertain as to the amount of fault attributable to each,
or is unable on the evidence to find the specific faults of each, the case is one of
"inscrutable fault". Lucas v. The Thomas Swann, Fed. Cas. No. 8, 588, 6
McLean 282 (1854); cf. The Tracy J. Bronson, Fed. Cas. No. 14, 131, 3 Ben.
341 (1869); The Breeze, Fed. Cas. No. 1, 829, 6 Ben. 14 (1872). "Inevitable
accident" is often used as a defence, and if established, exonerates from liability,
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apportionment," which "enables the court to apportion the total
of the damage done to ships in collision, when both are in fault, in
proportion to the gravity of the faults committed by them respec-
tively."''
Cayzer v. Carron Company4 satisfactorily explains the distinction
between the common-law rule and that of division of damages:
"there is no difference between the rules of Law and the rules of
Admiralty to this extent, that where one transgresses a navigation
rule, whether it is a statutory rule, or whether it is a rule that is im-
posed by common sense,... and thereby an accident happens of
which that transgression is the cause, he is to blame, and those who
are injured by the accident, if they themselves are not parties causing
the accident, may recover both in Law and in Admiralty. If the ac-
cident is a purely inevitable accident not occasioned by the fault of
either party, then Common Law and Admiralty equally say the loss
shall lie where it falls, each party shall bear his own loss. Where
the cause of the accident is the fault of one party, and one party only,
Admiralty and Common Law both agree in saying that that one party
who is to blame shall bear the whole damage of the other. When the
cause of the accident is the fault of both, each party being guilty of
blame which causes the accident, there is a difference between the
rule of Admiralty and the rule of Common Law. The rule of Common
Law says, as each occasioned the accident neither shall recover at all,
whereas "inscrutable fault" merely causes a division of damages. The Anna C.
Minch, 271 Fed. 192 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921). The former term means an accident
which both parties have tried to prevent by every means within their power,
with due care and caution. The Old Reliable, 269 Fed. 725 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921);
The Mary T. Tracy, 8 F. (2d) 59I (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); The Sea King, 14 F. (2d)
684 (S. D. N. Y. 1926); The Osceola & The Hercules, I8 F. (2d) 415 (S. D. N. Y.
1927), aff'd, 18 F. (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); cf. The H. Herberman, 33 F. (2d)
332 (E. D. N. Y. 1929); The Mendocino, 34 F. (2d) 783 (E. D. La. 1929); The
Michael Tracy, 4o F. (2d) 70 (S. D. N. Y. 1929), rev'd, 43 F. (2d) 965 (C. C. A.
2d, 193o); The Paris, 37 F. (2d) 734 (S. D. N. Y. 1930), aff'd, 44 F. (2d) io8
(C. C. A. 2d, 193o). "Inscrutable fault" is thus the case where the faults are so
equal that one cannot tell which preponderates, which calls for an equal division of
damages, while "inevitable accident" is a defense setting up an entire lack of fault
in defendant and a corresponding lack of liability on his part.
nArgentine, Russia, Sweden, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Austria,
Belgium, Nicaragua, Germany, Great Britain, Brazil, Roumania, Greece, Hol-
land, Denmark, Hungary, and France have ratified the BRUSSELS MARITIME
CONVENTION of I909-9io, which adopted the proportionate rule. Cuba, Chile,
Italy and Spain have yet to take action on the proposed rule.
23Rule established by the BRUSSELS MARITIME CONVENTION, and incorporated
into the ENGLISH MARITIME CONVENTIONS AcT of 1911 (I & 2 GEO. V, c. 57).
7A9 App. Cas. 873, 88o (1884).
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and it shall be just like an inevitable accident; the loss shall lie where
it falls. Admiralty says, on the contrary, if both contributed to the
loss, it shall be brought into hotchpotch and divided between
the two."'2 Courts of Admiralty of the United States have of late
uniformly followed the statements in this case, although there has
been a powerful movement for many years to bring about a change
from the division of loss rule to the proportionate rule.
The admiralty rule of the United States may well be looked upon as
a midway stepping-stone between the common-law rule of con-
tributory negligence, which bars recovery where plaintiff's fault has
contributed to the total injury, and the rule of comparative negli-
gence. As the common-law rule worked injustice in that it put all the
blame on but one of the parties at fault, so also in a lesser degree equal
division of damages may operate to cause more harm to one of the
wrong-doers than he deserves. The history of apportionment of loss
is of considerable interest as an illustration of the steady pressure
by which we may expect the doctrine of comparative negligence
to be established in the courts of common law.
a. Proportional Division in England
Among the Laws of Oleron we find several articles bearing upon the
subject of division of damages; one provided that damages were to be
divided equally not only in cases of mutual fault, and not only among
the vessels directly concerned, but also among the vessels and the
cargoes, whether -negligent or not, unless the element of intentional
harm entered." These latter were later incorporated in the Black
Book of the Admiralty in England. In 1266, the Code of Wisby,
article 2 6,27 apportioned the loss as between two ships in collision.
Article 70 of the same Code demanded that the master and mariners
of both ships swear that there was no element of intent in the collision,
in which case there would be an equal division of damages, but if they
would not so swear, the damage was to be "paid by the ship that did
it." The Danish and Swedish Codes of 15o8, i56i, and 168328 di-
vided the loss in case of accidental collision according to the rulings
nSee Hay v. Le Neve, 2 Shaw, Sc. App. 395 (1824), which settled the English
rule of division of damages, adhered to until the provisions of the MARrrImE CoN-
VENTIONS AcT took effect.
26ART. 10, 14, LAWS OF OLERON. See MARSDEN, COLLISIONS AT SEA (8th ed.
1923) 154.
2 7CODE OF WISBY (I505), ART. 26, 70; see Vol. 30 Fed. Cas. App. 1176, 1193,
1195.
28See 3 PARDESS, COLLECTION DES LOIS MARITIME (1831) 237, 261, 289; MARS-
DEN, loC. cit. supra note 26.
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of arbitrators. 29  The Ordonnance of Louis XIV, Section io, Title
730 and the Consolato del Mare' provided for division of damages in
special cases.
In England, in the 15th and 16th centuries, we find only two de-
cisions bearing upon the subject.32 In 1614 appears the first decision
for division of the damages.3 From then on until T647 there are
decisions which fluctuate from the equal division of damages to
apportionment of damages according to the degree of fault, and
finally revert to the rule of division of damages. In 1647 the first
really clear-cut decision of half-damages, awarded in a case where
the cause of the loss was uncertain, appears., In 169o, a certificate
of Sir Charles Hedges, Judge of the Admiralty, states that at that
date the rule of division of loss was applied in all cases where the
cause of loss was uncertain.3 5
The eighteenth century found the English courts of admiralty
leaning strongly toward the rule of equal division of loss in cases of un-
certain fault, or even where the fault was considerably greater on the
part of one of the colliding ships." All during this time the courts
were having difficulty in determining which of several rules of dam-
ages to apply in cases of collision.17 In 1815 and 1816, two famous
cases appear, The Woodrup-Sims38 and The Lord Melville. In The
Woodrup-Sims, one vessel alone was found guilty of fault, and al-
29Jn case of collision between a ship at anchor and one under way, the DAisH
CODE (1508, 1561, 1683) provided for a one-third, two-thirds division, without
arbitration.
30(1486). "In case of ships running aboard each other, the damage shall be
equally suffered by those that have suffered and done it, whether during the
course, in a road or in a harbor." Section ii provided: "But if the damage be
occasioned by either of the masters, it shall be repaired by him." 2 PARDESS, op.
cit. supra note 28, at 174 et seq.; MARSDEN, loc. cit. su.lra note 26; 30 Fed. Cas. p.
1215.
312 PARDESS, op. cit. supra note 28, at 174 et seg.; MARSDEN, op. Cit. supra note
26, at x55.
32ANNALLs OF IPswicH, N. BACON (1884) 421, 425, 539.
33Ad. Ct. Rec. Libels (1614), File 76, No. 33, Miscell. Bundles, Ser. ii, bdle.
227.
31File Io8, No. 342 (1647). See MARSDEN, op. Cit. supra note 26, at 157, for
additional citations.
uMiscell. Books 1012 (169o).
36Noden c. Ashton, Ass. Book, 2oth June, 17o6; The Petersfield and The Judith
Randolph, (1789) K. B. East., 27 GEO. IIn, rot. 1416; many others, cited in
MARSDEN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 160, 161. The authors wish to acknowledge
the aid given by Marsden's excellent historical analysis of this subject.
37MARSDEN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 155-I6o.
382 Dodson Adm. 83 (1815).
39Cited in Hay v. Le Neve, supra note 25, at 402.
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though the rules discussed in the case were not there applied, the
opinion is very valuable for the dicta laid down by Sir William
Scott, who said there were four possibilities of fault in collision cases:
i. Without fault on either vessel, in which case the loss should
rest where it fell.
2. Where both parties were to blame, when the loss should be
apportioned between them.
3. By fault of the suffering party only, in which case he was to
bear the loss.
4. By the sole fault of one ship running the other down, in which
case the injured party should be entitled to full compensation from
the party at fault.
The House of Lords approved these dicta in Hay v. Le Neve in
1824,40 a collision case in which the lower court found one of the ships
more at fault than the other, and awarded two-thirds damages
against the greater and one-third against the lesser delinquent. The
House of Lords varied the decision by dividing the damages equally.
Since Hay v. Le Neve, the dicta in The Woodrup-Sims have acquired,
through continual citation and application, the force of decision, and
up to a comparatively recent time, settled English law in favor of
equal division of damages where both parties were at fault, regard-
less of the degree in which the ships were found to be at fault.41
It should here be mentioned that where both vessels were at fault in a
collision and death resulted to an innocent passenger on one of the
vessels, the lower court and later the House of Lords held that an
action for damages would lie against one vessel, though both were at
fault.42 The courts also held that as actions for wrongful death under
Lord Campbell's Act were not admiralty actions, the rule of division
of loss would not apply; this meant that for a considerable time,
plaintiff could recover different measures of damage according as he
brought his action in the admiralty or in the common-law court.
The divergence was abolished by the Judicature Act of 187341 which
provided that in any cause or proceeding for damages arising out of
collision between two ships, where both were at fault, the rules
hitherto in force in admiralty, so far as they had been at variance
with the rules of the courts of common law, should prevail. Thus
the history of the topic indicates that the early English and present
40Supra note 25.
41The Monarch, I W. Rob. 21 (1839); The Bernina, x2 P. D. 58 (1887); The
Selingapatam, 3 W. Rob. 38 (1848); The Margaret, 6 P. D. 76 (1879); see also
supra notes 24, 25 and 38.
42The Avon, 22 Fed. 905 (N. D. Ill. 1885); The Bernina, supra note 41.
**JuDIcATURE AcT of 1873, 36 & 37 VICT. C. 25, § 9.
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American cases apply but an arbitrary formula of equal division of
loss.
At the end of the i 9 th century, lawyers, judges and shippers began
to agitate for proportional division of the damages. At that time
several leading countries had adopted" the rule, were using it success-
fully, and were attempting to bring the United States and Great
Britain into accord, so as to make its application universal.4 Inter-
national meetings were being held on the subject, the obvious in-
tention being to persuade other nations to adopt it.
In 1885, the Commercial Congress of Brussels and the Meeting
of the Institut de Droit International at Lausanne, and in 1892,
the Commercial Congress at Genoa, had met and had adopted the
proportional rule, although there were some who favored the rule
of equal division of loss. 46 England became much interested in the
proposed change and impetus was given to the movement, at the turn
of the century, by Englishmen whose experience entitled their opin-
ions to the greatest respect; among them we find representatives of
the Liverpool and London Steamship Protection Associations, the
American Chamber of Commerce of Liverpool, the London Steamship
Owners' Mutual Insurance Association and numerous other shipping
associations. In I895 the Brussels Conference of the International
Law Association, in 1896 the Chamber of Shipping in the United
Kingdom, and in I899 the International Marine Committee (London
* Conference) all went on record in favor of the change from the rule of
equal division of loss to the proportionate rule. The Brussels Con-
ference of 1895, called to discuss international maritime problems,
stated that the United States and the (then) British rule was but a
rule of thumb, and often did great injustice, and that "mathematical
accuracy was impracticable, but it was easy to get nearer to justice
than an equal division of damages in all cases." The International
Maritime Committee has held many conferences, the first in Brussels
"France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Greece, Portugal and Rou-
mania adopted and were successfully using the rule. It is interesting to note that
none of these countries have reverted to the rule of division of loss, and that there
are no complaints heard as to the satisfactory working of the rule.
45Franck's article, supra note 2o, and an article, Scott, Collisions at Sea Where
Both Ships are at Fault (1897) 13 L. Q. REv. 17, state the representative type of
arguments in favor of the proposed rule.4
'Bynkershoek describes the strong dissent of his fellow-judges sitting on the
Supreme Court of the Netherlands, when he attempted to persuade them in 1629
to apply the proportionate rather than the equal division rule, "memini me
senatore et de geometrica proportione perorante reliquos senatoresobstupuisse
atque si Jovis ignibus icti essent." B-Nu., QUAEST. JUR. PRIV. I. IV. c. 20 (1629);
see also MARSDEN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 155.
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in 1897, and has attempted consistently to make the proportionate
rule universal in its application. Also the British Diplomatic Con-
ference, which held its first meeting in i9o5, has thrown its weight
toward the proportionate rule.
Although at the turn of the twentieth century there had been in
England much agitation for and against the proportionate rule, it was,
nevertheless, a huge surprise for the maritime world when England
finally adopted the proposed rule. In the face of its settled rule of
division of loss, and the legislative action which appeared in the
Judicature Act of i873,47 and despite the grapple-hold that the idea of
division of loss in admiralty seemed to have on the nation, England in
one fell swoop overturned its past policies by the Maritime Con-
ventions Act of 1g, 1.41 The Act provides: "Where by the fault of two
or more vessels, damage or loss is caused to one or more of those
vessels, their cargoes or freight, or to any property on board, the
liability to make good the damage or loss shall be in proportion
to the degree in which each vessel is at fault." Several provisions
and exceptions are made, one of which is: "If, having regard to all
the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to establish different
degrees of fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally. '49
It has accordingly been decided that where the evidence does not
clearly establish that a preponderance of guilt rests upon one ship,
the division of damages should be half and half. To quote Lord
Sumner,"0 "The conclusion that it is possible to establish different
degrees of fault must be a conclusion proved by evidence, judicially
arrived at, and sufficiently made out. Conjecture will not do; a
general leaning in favour of one ship rather than of the other will not
do; sympathy for one of the wrongdoers, too indefinite to be sup-
ported by a reasoned judgment, will not do."
The law as to division of loss has thus been greatly altered in
England by the Maritime Conventions Act.. It establishes an en-
tirely different basis for the division of loss. The liability of the
owner of a vessel in fault may be increased or decreased from the half
damages for which he would have been liable before the Act-,i the
Act does away with English statutes which had provided that a
vessel which had violated a Sea Regulation was, in case of a collision,
conclusively presumed to have been at fault;52 it affects the kind of
damages which the owner of a vessel can claim to share with the
4736 & 37 Vicr. c. 66 (1873). '81 & 2 GEo. V, c. 57, § I.
"9Cf. supra note 21.
Ivlhe Peter Benoit, 13 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. (N. S.) 203, 208 (1915).
"Supra note 48, § I. nSupra note 48, § 4.
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owner of another vessel. Claims for loss of life under Lord Camp-
bell's Act" or for personal injuries, which did not come under the rule
of division of damages before the passing of the Act," are now under
the rule;" also, the Act places a time limit on certain actions arising
out of collision. 6
England having joined all other leading nations, with the sole
exception of the United States,57 as to apportionment of loss in
collision cases, it is quite probable that this nation will sooner or
later move to the more equitable rule."8 From the latest obtainable
reports those nations which have adopted the proportionate rule are
entirely satisfied and apparently no difficulty is experienced in its
administration."
b. Equal Division of Loss in the United States
The admiralty courts of the United States had no established
rule of damages in collision cases until the middle of the nineteenth
century. 0 We find before that time many cases of division of loss,
showing the court's disapproval of the common-law rule of con-
tributory negligence; a few cases applied the common-law rule
"FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT, 9 & 10 VICT. C. 93 (1846).
"The Circe, io Asp. Mar. L. Cas. (N. s.) 149 (I905); The General Havelock, 21
T. L. R. 438 (1905).
"Supra note 48, § 3; cf. ibid. § 2.
"Supra note 48, § 8. The court may, in its discretion, extend the time limit,
The Cambric, 29 T. L. R. 69 (1912).
57Supra note 22.
"Enactment of legislation similar to the MARITIME CONVENTIONS ACT would
cause little procedural change in the law of collisions in the United States, and it is
submitted that the more desirable rule of proportionate damages would not in-
volve the greatly feared results set forth in arguments of its opponents.
"The sole argument against the present operation of the rule appears to be
that the courts do not apportion, costs according to negligence, as well as the
damages. See REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON ADMIRALTY (1929) 54 A. B. A. REP.
278, for the statement that Great Britain is eminently satisfied with the operation
of the rule, and has found no difficulty in its application to cases of mutual fault.
"Massachusetts divided the damages in a case of mutual fault. The Rival, I
Sprague 128, 20 Fed. Cas. No. II, 867 (1846). In Maine, Judge Ware said the
rule applied in cases of inscrutable, uncertain or mutual fault. The Scioto, 21
Fed. Cas. 774, Fed. Cas. No. 12, 5o8, (1847). New York limited division of loss
rule to cases of mutual fault. The Bay State, Abb. Adm. 239 (1848). In I852, the
question of division of damages came before the Supreme Court ofthe United
States for the first time in a case of inevitable accident, and the court allowed the
loss to lie where it fell. Stainback v. Rae, 14 How. 532 (U. S. 1852); cf. Smith v.
Condry, i How. 28 (U. S. 1843). In 1854, damages were divided in cases of
inscrutable or uncertain fault, Lucas v. The Thomas Swann, supra note 21.
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while others ventured to apply the proportionate rule. Of this last
group, The Mary Ida' is a good example. The court held that in
cross suits growing out of a collision of vessels, there being fault
proved on both sides, damages were to be apportioned according
to the disparity of fault, and the ratio decided upon was one-fourth to
three-fourths. Our admiralty courts finally adopted the dicta in
The Woodrup-Sis,2 and in 1854 it was settled, in The Schooner
Catherine,6 that where both ships were at fault, the damages were to
be divided equally, regardless of the degree of fault. All that is
necessary is to prove that mutual fault has concurred in producing
the injury complained of," and although one vessel has been guilty
of but slight fault, she may be held liable for one-half of the damages.5
The history of the attempt to make the United States an adherent
of the proportionate rule is much the same as that in Great Britain,
although as yet our federal courts and legislature refuse to change the
settled rule of equal division of loss. Arguments in favor of the change
have been heard from all sides during the past forty years, and the
Maritime Law Association of the United States has for some time
considered the desirability of changing to the proportionate rule.8
A meeting of the latter group held in 1922 reported favorably upon its
adoption, but in 1 927 a new special committee having been appointed,
another report was presented in which the majority was against the
adoption of the rule,87 and the meeting upheld the report. The Ameri-
can Bar Association has interested itself in the problem for some
years past, but as yet has accomplished little, although it definitely
612o Fed. 741 (S. D. Ala. 1884); cf. The Anerly, 58 Fed. 794 (S. D. N. Y. 1893);
The Rival, supra note 6o.
2Supra note 38.
'3I7 How. 170 (U. S. 1854).
64Jacobsen v. Dalles, 1o6 Fed. 428 (D. Ore. i901), aff'd, 114 Fed. 705 (C. C. A.
9th, 19o2), cert. den. 191 U. S. 575, 24 Sup. Ct. 847 (1903); Ruckman v. The Five
Boys, 2o Fed. Cas. 12, 107 (1863); Cannon v. The Potomac, 5 Fed. Cas. 2386, 3
Woods 158 (1878); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302, (1876); and see
Robinson, Legal Adjustments of Personal Injury in the Maritime Industry (193o) 44
HARv. L. REV. 223.
'AWard v. The M. Dousman, 29 Fed. Cas. 17, 153, 6 McLean 231, Newb. Adm.
236 (1854); The Philip Minch, 128 Fed. 578 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o4); The Athabasca,
45 Fed. 651 (W. D. Mich. 1890); Thompson v. The Great Republic, 23 Wall. 20
(U. S. 1874).
Wilhelmus Mynderse of New York, admiralty lawyer of great repute, was an
active representative in favor of the proportionate rule in 1899. See REPORT
INTERNATIOziAL MARITIME COMMITTEE, London Conference, 1899.
6 The arguments advanced in the report are practically the same as those
advanced in the 1929 REPORT OF TIE COMMITTEE ON ADMIRALTY of the American
Bar Association, supra note 59, discussed later.
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succeeded in bringing brilliant legal minds of the country to bear
upon the desirability of a change. In Egii, the President of the
United States and the Secretary of State were considering the prob-
lem, but there were many protests against adoption of the rule, and
they discontinued their efforts in its behalf and in behalf of an inter-
national convention to formulate some provision such as that of the
English Maritime Conventions Act of 19,3:.18
Little further action was taken on the subject until 1925, but since
that time there has been a greatly increased interest in the proposed
change, and it seems predictable that sometime in the not distant
future Congress may provide for the application of the proportionate
rule in ship collision cases of mutual fault. In 1925, the meeting of
the American Bar Association adopted a resolution directing the Com-
mittee on Commerce and the Committee on Admiralty to prepare
a bill providing for the proportionate rule of damages "thus bringing
our laws into conformity with those of all other maritime nations."
In 1926 a Committee on Collisions reported adversely to adoption of
the rule, but in 1927 it did not make further report on it. None
of the above committees reported on the subject in 1928. In 1929,
in its report to the convention, the Committee on Commerce and on
Admiralty stated that it had inquired into the working of the rule in
other countries and had elicited the information that in general
"the rule is working with entire satisfaction. Indeed, the only
adverse criticism respects the failure of the British rule to apportion
costs also in accordance with the apportionment of damages."
However, the Committee, having given great consideration to the
subject, ended by proposing the following resolution: 69 "Be it re-
solved, By this Association that as the present maritime law of the
United States relative to division of damages in collision cases has
operated satisfactorily for a long number of years, no change in such
law should be approved by this Association." The Committee
assigned five major reasons for recommending that the present rule
be kept in force, namely:
(a) That the rule of proportionate damages will impose too great a
burden on our judges.
(b) That the City of New York rule,7 0 that courts should not look
for minor faults, is sufficient for practical purposes.
(c) That the "in extremis" rule would be emasculated.
68Supra note 48.
69REPoRT OF THE CoMMiTTEE ON ADMIRALTY of the American Bar Association,
supra note 59.70The City of New York, 147 U. S. 72, 13 Sup. Ct. 211 (1893).
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(d) That collision litigation would be carried to common-law
courts.
(e) That appeals would be increased and compromises made more
difficult.
Since these same reasons, which have offered the chief resistance
to the adoption of more liberal rules in admiralty, will be levelled
with equal force at any attempt by the courts of common law to
adopt the rule of comparative negligence, it will be profitable to ex-
amine each of them in turn.
(i) Objections to the Adoption of the Proportional Rule
As to the imposition of too great a burden on our judges, the
experience of other countries applying the rule of proportionate
damages shows strongly that no difficulty has been encountered on
this point. The Maritime Conventions Act of igI in England has
provided, and any sensible legislation on the subject would provide,
that where it is difficult or impossible to allocate the degrees of blame
on both ships, but where it is proven that both were in fault in some
degree, the rule of division of loss would not be altered, and that each
wrongdoer should bear one-half of the total loss." But in the ma-
jority of cases it is possible to find blame greater on one side than on
the other,72 and in such cases it is only fair that there should be an
apportioning of the loss, so that one would not be held liable for
greater damages, and the other for less damages than he deserves.
The American Bar Association Committee on Admiralty, in recom-
mending an equal division, even where degrees of fault are unequal,
followed the reasoning of Dr. Lushington,73 who considered that it is
impossible to accurately apportion the damages under such circum-
stances, and that, as a result, much difficulty will be introduced into
collision litigation; that no two judges would agree as the exact
proportion to be made, and it would prove impossible for counsel in
nSupra note 48, ART. i: "If there is mutual fault, the liability of each vessel is in
proportion to the gravity of the faults respectively committed; but, if, according
to the circumstances, the proportion cannot be established, or if it appears that
the faults are equal, the liability is apportioned equally."
72Alfred Huger, Proportional Damage Rule in Collisions at Sea (1927) 13
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 531, 547, gives figures of total number of collisions in
England 1922-1927, and number of cases in which it was possible to find pro-
portional negligence. Leslie Scott, supra note 45, gives list of cases illustrating
the unfairness attendant upon the rule of dividing the loss. Franck, supra note
2o, at 263, shows briefly the practical value of the proportional rule. See also
The Margaret, infra note 113, and discussion of the case in the body of this article
infra.73The Milan, Lush. 388 (Adm. 186x).
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any collision case 'to advise with accuracy. Grant that it is not
always possible to make an accurate apportionment; yet in many
cases it would be far easier to say which was to blame in the greater
degree than to tell which fault was the proximate cause of the col-
lision. Besides, even the most rabid proponent of the proportionate
rule would not demand absolute accuracy in the division; all that is
hoped for is an approximately correct apportionment, and it is re-
spectfully submitted that a half and half division is often anything
but a fair or just apportionment. 4 Franck says that the change in
Britain to the rule of division of loss was largely dictated by a feeling
that the adopted rule was fairer than the rule of leaving the loss to lie
where it fell, and, as Franck says, "division of loss by halves is one
step on the road to proportional division of loss."
At first glance it might appear that the task of apportioning the
blame is an impossible one; but the proportional rule is to be applied
only to those cases in which it clearly appears that there are dis-
tinctly different degrees of negligence, and where this does appear,
it is not unduly difficult to determine in rough proportions of one-
third or one-fourth how much more negligent one ship has been than
the other.7 5 In most of the border-line cases it is probable that
neither ship is entirely blameless, and that one ship is much more to
blame than the other. The law should be an instrument of justice,
and since under our present admiralty rule justice obviously cannot
be done in these border-line cases, the reason given by the committee,
that it would place too great a burden on our judges, sounds sus-
piciously like a sluggish unwillingness to expend effort to remedy
an unsatisfactory condition. Much better that mistakes be made
occasionally in the application of the rule of apportionment than that
frequently the less culpable ship be mulcted in a greater share, and
the more culpable in a less share, of the total damage.
Franck effectively refutes this argument of the committee: "My
experience is that in collision cases the fault is very often more on
the one side than the other; but even if such difference happened but
"
4Franck, op. cit. supra note 20.
7Franck, op. cit. supra note 2 , at 264: "I have often been told by judges that it
is much easier to make such a comparison than to decide what was the operative
cause of the collision, with a view of fixing one ship with the whole responsibility
and holding the other blameless.... [T]he Court acts... exactly as in penal
matters, where it fixes the penalty at some point between the maximum and
the minimum allowed by law, to suit the gravity of the offense." The usual
fractions are thirds, fourths, or fifths, in the countries which have adopted the
proportionate rule; where more than two ships are at fault, the fractions may be
smaller.
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once in twenty cases, the most elementary sense of justice would
demand a difference in treatment of the two parties .... If a pair of
scales is the emblem of maritime justice they are strange scales, in
which the slightest neglect-inim aulpa-less even than that, a
statutory presumption of fault-weighs as many pounds sterling
as the grossest misconduct."76  He continues, "It is impossible to
understand why a law which recognizes the principle of dividing the
liability should decide that in every case the division should be by
halves. That is purely arbitrary. Either the principle of division
is just, and then it should be complete, that is proportional; or it is un-
just, and there should be no division, by halves any more than by
quarters. 7 The system is not an attempt to convert a collision case
into a .mathematical problem. It is a question not of algebra but of
common sense. And justice fails when the judge, although seeing
negligence which ought not to remain unblamed, cannot or will not
keep it in sight because he cannot bring himself to punish a trifling
fault with liability for half of the total loss. Surely the proportional
rule which avoids extremes is the fair one."7 8 And, as Judge Simon-
ton says, "there are cases in which it would seem to be manifestly
inequitable to assess equally the loss. How long will such manifest
inequity remain the law of this country?" 79
In penal cases, where the court fixes the penalty at some point
between the minimum and the maximum allowed by law, it must
vary its every judgment to suit the gravity of the offence, but we hear
no argument concerning any huge burden placed on our judges in
fixing penalties. In fact, it is far better to allow the court a little
leeway in which to exercise its reasoned judgment, than to impose
upon it the arbitrary rule of division of loss.
It is difficult to perceive why the Committee on Admiralty fears
change in the effect of the "itt extremis" rule by the adoption of pro-
76Frauck, op. cit. supra note 2o, at 262. In England, by 36 & 37 VIcr. c. 85,
§ 17 (x873), a ship was deemed to be in fault unless she could show that the vio-
lation of the rule could not have caused or contributed causally to the collision.
The Stoomvaart, 5 App. Cas. 876 (188o); The Imbro, i4 P. D. 73 (1889). In the
United States, a violation of a statutory rule to prevent collision raises a pre-
sumption of culpability, and a ship guilty of such violation must show that it
could not have been one of the causes of collision. The Greystoke Castle, 194
Fed. 521 (N. D. Cal. 1912); The Eagle Wing, 135 Fed. 826 (E. D. Va. i9o5); The
Arthur M. Palmer, 115 Fed. 417 (E. D. N. Y. 19o2); extensive list of cases, ii
C. J. 1181 n. 71.
7 Franck, op. cit. supra note 2o, at 264. The point is also excellently considered
by Leslie Scott, supra note 45.
7sSupra note 2o, at 264.
79The Victory, 68 Fed. 395 (C. C. A. 4th, 1895).
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portionate division of damages. Under the "in extremis" rule, if a
vessel, by her negligence, places another vessel in a perilous situation,
and the latter, because of the excitement, takes the wrong course,
the negligence of the first is considered the efficient proximate cause,
and that ship is liable for the entire loss.8 It is universally recog-
nized that in the face of imminent danger, not created by or con-
tributed to by him, one is not required to act with the same amount
of care and caution as is demanded under normal circumstances."'
The application of this doctrine of error in extremis should be pre-
cisely the same under either the proportionate or division of loss rule.
The defense of contributory negligence and the defense of error in
extremis are very different; if the former is proved, it goes merely to
reduction of damages in admiralty, while the latter, if proved, ab-
solves from all fault and liability. The vessel which pleads error in
extrenis must show that she herself was not in initial fault; if her
previous improper maneuvers have caused in any way the perilous
situation, she cannot claim freedom from fault at the last moment
because she must act in the face of that same imminent peril."' Appli-
cation of the rule of proportionate negligence would result in a much
more equitable allocation of the damages where the ship pleading
error in extremis is shown to have been guilty of some slight initial
negligence creating the perilous situation. The rule of equal division
of loss in such case either holds this wrong-doer entirely free from all
guilt and liability, thus condoning slight but nevertheless real con-
tributory negligence, or it charges her with one-half of the total loss,
in effect holding her as guilty as the 6ther party, whose negligence
may have been gross and inexcusable."' An allocation of the damages
in the ratio of, say, one-fifth to four-fifths, appeals much more strong-
ly to our sense of justice.
80HuoHEs, ADmnIzALTrY (2d ed. Hornbook Ser. 1920) 331; The Lucille, 15 Wall.
674 (U. S. 1872); The Chatham, 52 Fed. 396 (C. C. A. 4th, 1892); E. Lucken-
bach, 93 Fed. 841 (C. C. A. 4th, 1899); Bonnah v. Lakeside S. S. Co., 221 Fed. 4o
(C. C. A. 5th, 1915).
nHalderman v. Beckwith, ii Fed. Cas. No. 5,90o7, 4 McLean 286 (1847); The
Atlantis, ii Fed. 568 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o3).
nThe Noreuga, 211 Fed. 355 (E. D. Va. 1914); The Protector, I13 Fed. 868
(C. C. A. 2d, I9O2); The Newport News, 83 Fed. 522 (E. D. Va. 1897); The New
York, 53 Fed. 553 (E. D. Mich. 189i); The Gratitude, 14 Fed. 479 (E. D. Pa.
x882); Minn. S. S. Co. v. Lehigh Valley Transp. Co., 129 Fed. 22 (C. C. A. 6th,
19O4), cert. den. x95 U. S. 636 (19o4); The Manchioneal, 243 Fed. 801 (C. C.
A.2d, 1917); The Munrio, ii F. (2d) goo (N. D. Cal. x926).
nScott, supra note 45, has cases showing the unfairness; see The Claire & The
Chinook, 34 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), aft'g, 29 F. (2d) 765 (S. D. N. Y.
(1928). Cf. cases cited in note 82.
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The argument that collision litigation would be carried into com-
mon-law courts should have little weight. In the United States it is
true that collision cases may be litigated in the State courts as well
as in the federal courts. 4 The peculiar anomaly of the co-existence
of two diverse sets of rules, admiralty and common law, to govern
the same case, should have been corrected long ago. Great Britain
early saw that the disposition of the case should not depend on the
mere choice of the forum, and she provided in the Judicature Act of
18733" that in cases of mutual fault, the rules in admiralty, when at
variance with the rules of common law, should prevail. In Canada
also," the admiralty rule is applied both in admiralty and common-
law courts.
Legislation should provide either that rules of admiralty should
prevail in collision cases, regardless of the court in which suit is
brought, or the common-law courts should be influenced to follow
the advice of the more experienced federal courts on the subject.
As was said by District Judge Hale in The Devona," "It is not for me
to determine the duty of a state court; but I think a state court in
case of a maritime tort should also be controlled by the same maritime
rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, and that
it should not follow the common-law rule of procedure which it would
follow in a case not maritime in its nature, for, as I have said, 'courts
constantly enforce rights arising from and depending upon other laws
than those governing the local transactions of the jurisdiction in
which they sit."' The Supreme Court decided in 18go the famous
case of The Max Morris, 7 which held that in admiralty cases the rules
of admiralty should prevail, where one was injured on a vessel through
a maritime tort arising partly from his own negligence and partly
from the negligence of the officers of the ship, and that contributory
negligence would be no bar to recovery."'
But the cases have been in conflict where suit was brought in a
'See an admirable exposition of this confusing and unsettled topic by Robinson,
op. cit. supra note 64, at 244.
8aSupra note 47, § 25, sub-section 9.
43 VIcr. c. 29, § 8 (1879); The Eliza Keith, 3 Que. L. R. 143 (1877); The
Dorothy, io Can. Exch. 163 (19o6).
8I F. (2d) 482, 484 (D. Me. 1924); see also The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398, 28
Sup. Ct. 135 (I9O7).
8713 7 U. S. I, II SUp. Ct. 29 (I89o).
8SCmrter v. Brown, 212 Fed. 393 (C. C. A. 5th, I914); Port of N. Y. Stevedoring
Co. v. Castagna, 280 Fed. 618 (C. C. A. 2d, I922); The Atlas, 93 U. S. 3o2 (1876);
The North Star, io6 U. S. 17, i Sup. Ct. 41 (1882); The Eugene F. Moran, 212
U. S. 466, 29 Sup. Ct. 339 (i9o9); The Margaret, infra note 113; The Daylesford,
30 Fed. 633 (S. D. Ala. 1887). See also 2 C. J. 120 for list of cases.
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court of common law. Atlee v. Packet Company,"9 a suit in admiralty,
contained a dictum that if suit had been brought at common law, the
rules of that forum.would apply.90 Belden v. Chase9' adopted the
above dictum in a decision rendered by the United States Supreme
Court on error from the New York Court of Appeals. Port of New
York Stevedoring Company v. Castagna2 applied the admiralty rule,
the court saying, "The right to recover [damages for a maritime tort]
irrespective of contributory negligence is a right, and not a matter of
procedure, nor governed by the choice of a forum." So that the fact
that an injured employee sought his remedy at common law, instead
of in admiralty, did not make his contributory negligence a bar
to recovery. Unfortunately, the New York Courts have reached
a different result in Maleeny v. Standard Shipbuilding Corporation"3
and in Ward v. Turner &? Blanchard,94 both of which hold that the
common law rule of contributory negligence applies to actions in
state courts for a maritime tort.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia in a 1928 case95 applied admiralty
rules and regarded it as settled beyond question that in maritime
torts maritime law applies to the exclusion of state law, so far as
matters of substance are concerned. The Virginia Court cites Messel
v. Foundation Company,9" which held, reversing the state court, that
plaintiff might prosecute his remedy in the state court for the tort,
but that the principles applicable to the recovery "must be limitedto
those which the admiralty law of the United States prescribes." The
Virginia Court saysssa of the Messel case, "This case, as we under-
stand it, closes the discussion. When one suffers an injury under
such circumstances as, to be a maritime tort, his rights are fixed by
the admiralty law; but he may choose the forum in which to assert
those rights. He has his remedy at common law, but his recovery and
the precise relief to be afforded him are determined by the admiralty
law which is applied, whether he sues in the common law or ad-
miralty court. He may pursue his remedy at common law in the
892x Wall. 389 (U. S. 1874).
9OThe court stated that "the admiralty rule commends itself quite as favorably
in its influence in securing practical justice as the other [divided damages]."
"I15o U. S. 674, 14 Sup. Ct. 264 (1893).
"Supra note 88, at 624, cert. den. 258 U. S. 631, 42 Sup. Ct. 463 (1922).
3237 N. Y. 250, 142 N. E. 602 (1923).
" 2 0 2 N. Y. Supp. 895, rev'd, 2o8 App. Div. 747 (1924).
IsColonna Shipyard v. Bland, i5o Va. 349, 143 S. E. 729,59 A. L. R. 497 (1928);
see note 59 A. L. R., at 5o4.
"274 U. S. 427, 47 Sup. Ct. 695 (1927), annotated in (1927) 5o A. L. R. 455.
NaSupra note 95, at 358.
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State court, but that court must administer the admiralty law." In
1922, in Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger,97 we find the United
States Supreme Court unequivocally saying, "The general rules of
maritime law apply whether the proceeding be instituted in an
admiralty or common-law court." In view of the fact that the
Supreme Court has consistently indicated of late that there should be
uniformity in application of rules in such maritime cases, and that it
advises the use of admiralty rather than common-law rules, it would
appear that this is a fit subject for legislative action.9
The risk of multiplied appeals has been the main stumbling-block
to the adoption of the proportionate rule, and the Committee on
Admiralty restates it in the recent report.9" In 1897, an excellent
articleby Mr. LeslieScott, 0 1 in commenting on Mr. Franck's article,10'
stated that the opponents of the rule believed it would lead to an
increase of appeals, and said, "It is difficult to know the cause of this
belief, but the following considerations seem to afford a sufficient
9'259 U. S. 255, 42 Sup. Ct. 476 (1922). The Court cites Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 4o Sup. Ct. 438, I A. L. R. 1145 (1920). See also
Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S.33, 46 Sup. Ct. 419 (1926).
'$Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, supra note 97 and cases cited therein;
Sprague, supra note 2o; So. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524
(1917), L. R. A. 1918C, 451, ANN. CAs. 19 17E, 900; see also note L. R. A. 1917F,
678, showing conflict as it existed in 1917; Messel v. Foundation Co., supra note
96; Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 38 Sup. Ct. 501, L. R. A.
1918F, 991 (1918); Robins Dry Dock Co. v. Dahl, 266 U. S. 449, 45 Sup. Ct. 157
(1925); The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 23 Sup. Ct. 483 (19o3); The Devona, i F. (2d)
482 (D. Me. 1924); Johnson v. U. S. Shipping Board, 24 F. (2d) 963 (C. C. A.
2d, I928). In United States v. Norfolk Berkley Bridge Corp., 29 F. (2d) 115, 132
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928), the court said, "When it is borne in mind that the court, in
such a collision case [ship colliding with bridge], is considering the cross-claims
of the parties involved, it shocks one's sense of justice to conclude that, if the
damages of the ship exceed the damages suffered by the bridge, the ship may
recover one-half the difference between the damages on the respective sides, but,
if the damages of the bridge exceed those of the ship, the bridge may have no
recovery whatsoever. It could not have been the intention of Congress that such
an anomalous situation should arise." The admiralty rule was applied.
99REPoRT OF THE ComuTTEE ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 59.
10OScott, supra note 45, considers the subject of appeals further, but along the
same lines as Franck, supra note 20, who says, at 270, in 1896, "On the question of
the effects which the proportional rule has upon the frequency of appeals, no
unfavorable evidence is forthcoming, either in Belgium, or any other country
where the proportional rule applies. There is no reason to think that the law of
apportioning the damage to the fault gives rise to more litigation or appeals on
the continent than the rule of division of loss in Great Britain." In view of the
fact that Mr. Franck later was made President of the International Maritime
Committee, his word is authoritative on such matters.
'O1Supra note 20.
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answer. Firstly, appeals on the proportions, in which blame is
allocated by the court, are appeals on a question of fact, and must be
subject to the restrictions which limit other appeals on questions of
fact. Secondly, being appeals against the amount of damages, they
are appeals from the discretion of the court below, and subject to
even greater restrictions. Thirdly, there are grounds for thinking
that appeals under the proportional rule will be treated by the Court
of Appeal much as it now treats appeals against the quantum of
salvage awards." Scott likens the probable dealing with appeals in
cases of proportionate negligence with that of appeals in salvage
cases, and says, "appeals from the quantitative estimate, made in the
discretion of the court, of the value of salvage services, are dis-
couraged by the court, so, it is submitted, will appeals be discouraged
from the quantitative estimate of the blame, which takes the form of
an apportionment under the proportionate rule." He cites The
Clarisse'012 and The Star of Persia' as supporting his contention.
In the former it was said, "It is a settled rule, and one of great utility
with reference to cases of this description, that the difference [be-
tween the lower court's award and what the appellate court may
think ought to have been awarded] must be very considerable to
induce a court of appeal to interfere upon a question of mere dis-
cretion." In the latter, Lord Esher said, "The rule has been correctly
stated that if this court cannot say that he has acted contrary to any
principle, then, if the amount does not seem unreasonable, it cannot
interfere."
In 1927, Mr. Huger states, in an article on Proportionate Damages
in Admiralty,1 " "there is not likely to be more divergence of view
than now exists when appeals are prosecuted in mutual fault cases.
The English courts have held, in cases since adoption of the Con-
vention rule, that the decision of the judge of first instance should not
lightly be interfered with .. "I"
It is submitted, therefore, that dealings with appeals would be
little changed by adopting the proportionate rule. At present, the
courts hold that on appeal, every presumption is in favor of the award
of the court below, and it will not be reversed except for manifest
error,l0 6 and findings of fact will not be disturbed when not against
'022 Moore, P. C. Rep. 34o (1856). 1016 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 220 (x887).
"04Huger, op. cit. supra note 72, at 547-548.
10'Huger, op. cit. supra note 72, cites The Peter Benoit, 84 L. J. R. 87 (1915),
and The Clara Camus, 26 Lloyd's List L. R. 39. The latter contains a warning
against too great discrimination in determining degrees of fault.
"0The S. B. Wheeler, 20 Wall. 385 (U. S. 1874), in which the Court said, "The
doctrine, over and over again ruled by this court, that every presumption is in
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the preponderance ofthe evidence. 0 7 In The Sabine,'1 8 the Supreme
Court held that it would not review the action of the lower court upon
questions of fact, and a long line of cases follow this decision. 0 9 In
view of such holdings, it would appear that an appeal based on the
finding of the trial court on the degree of negligence would be likely
to avail an appellant very little. England, under the proportionate
rule, has not experienced an increase of appeals, and it is but reason-
able to believe that experience in this country would be similar." 0
The primary argument of the Committee on Admiralty against the
adoption of the proportionate rule is that the rule in The City of New
York,"' that the court should not look for minor faults, is sufficient
for all practical purposes. Let it be conceded that for most purposes,
and for the majority of collision cases, the rule of division of loss is
reasonably satisfactory, works substantial justice, is fairly easy of
application, and fairly allocates the damages, yet every year there are
a few cases of mutual but quantitatively varying fault, and it is in
such cases that the courts should be able to invoke a more flexible
rule than that of equal division of loss. Those familiar with admiralty
proceedings and decisions will admit that there is a tendency wholly
to ignore cases of slight negligence in order to avoid inflicting on the
slightly negligent a penalty of half damages. In such cases the negli-
gence of the one goes unrebuked while the other party is held to a
higher measure of damages than he deserves. n2
favor of the decrees [below] and that there will be no reversal here unless for
manifest error, is again declared." See also The Commerce, 16 Wall. 33 (U. S.
x872); infra note 1O9.
107The Curtin, 217 Fed. 245 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914), aff'g, 205 Fed. 989 (E. D. Va.
1913); The Captain Weber, 89 Fed. 957 (C. C. A. 9th, 1898); The Buffalo, 55
Fed. io9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1893); The Juniata, 93 U. S. 337 (1876).
108103 U. S. 540 (i88o).
109Earlier cases, Ii C. J. 1197, notes 52-56. Later cases, Clinchfield Fuel Co. v.
Henderson Iron Works Co., 254 Fed. 411 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918); The Eleanore,
248 Fed. 472 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918) (findings of District Court on question of fact as
to fault of one ship held not reviewable by appellate court); The Rockaway, 246
Fed. 682 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917), aff'g, 24o Fed. 844 (E. D. Va. 1917) (responsibility
for collision being a doubtful question of fact, trial court's finding will not be
disturbed); The Almirante S. S. Corp. v. U. S., 34 F. (2d) 123 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929)
(appellant has heavy burden to upset lower court's decree on conflicting evi-
dence).
noSupra note 59. Apparently collision litigation has not increased perceptibly
since England's adoption of the rule, and there was no adverse report on the
number of appeals in the REPORT OF CoMMIT=E ON ADMIRALTY AND COLLISION
supra note 59. 'nSupra note 70.
'-Scott, supra note 45, gives examples of the unfairness of the operation of the
rule. The Umbria, 166 U. S. 404, 17 Sup. Ct. 6Io (1897); The Ludvig Holberg,
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A good example of the need for a more flexible rule in collision
cases is the case of Te Margaret,"3 decided in 1929. In this case The
Merchant was found to have been at fault in persisting to force a
port to port passing, after signals had been exchanged for a starboard
passing, and in not slowing down her engines or reversing when
danger of collision became apparent; The Margaret was found at fault
for keeping on her course without slackening speed or reversing after
she should have seen that The Merchant was disregarding passing
signals, and that danger was imminent. The Circuit Court of Appeals,
Third District, found that the primary and major fault was The
Merchant's, The Margaret being at fault in a lesser degree; damages
were apportioned one-fourth to three-fourths. On rehearing on the
matter of damages, the court said, "There developed a situation of
mutual faults to which it seemed that the rule of mutual liability
should not, in view of the found inequality of fault, be applied; but
rather that the damages should be apportioned to the negligence
respectively attributable to the two ships, when, as here, it can be
fairly ascertained. Therefore the court, in an attempt to conform
the decree to its fact findings and to do justice to the ship least
offending, directed apportionment of the damages in the manner
indicated." The court then cites cases on the equal division of loss
rule and concludes that it cannot do otherwise than follow the rule. It
therefore reversed the decree of proportionate division.
A desire to effectuate substantial justice would dictate that, in a
case such as The Margaret, where faults are obviously unequal and
yet ascertainable, there is real need for a more flexible rule which the
court may apply in its discretion. To bind the court to a rule which
both lawyers and judges admit may work injustice and hardship to
either or both litigants is to force the rendition of a decision which it
recognizes as based on the fallacy of equal fault; where it has already
been determined that the faults are unequal, it follows naturally that
the parties should be assessed in accordance with the quantum of
fault committed by them respectively.
The various arguments set up against the proportionate rule in
admiralty are similar to those put forth against adoption of the rule of
comparative negligence in the courts of common law. If these
arguments have been in the least refuted in the field of admiralty,
157 U. S. 6o, 15 Sup. Ct. 477 (1895); The Victory & The Plymothian, 168 U. S.
410, 18 Sup. Ct. 149 (1897); La Flandre, 9 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1926); The
Michael Tracy, 4o F. (2d) 70 (S. D. N. Y. 1929), rev'd, 43 F. (2d) 965 (C. C.
A. 2d, x93o).
1133o F. (2d) 923 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
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which now operates under the rule of division of loss, they should be
wholly ineffective in the field of common-law, which entertains the
extreme rule of contributory negligence. If equal division of loss
works obvious hardship where both parties are at fault, though in
varying degrees, how true it is that an entire lack of apportioning of
damages at common law, where contributory negligence on the
part of a slightly negligent plaintiff is proved, brings about great in-
justice. Fairness to the parties litigant demands that, in cases of un-
equal fault, each party should be required to stand that portion of the
total loss which corresponds with his amount of fault.
As the courts of admiralty of the United States have found the
equal division of loss rule sufficiently inequitable in certain cases to
express the desire that admiralty adopt a more flexible rule, that of
proportionate negligence, so also should the courts of common law
demand that they be allowed some latitude in determining, in cases
of mutual fault, to what extent each party should bear the total loss.
Since the United States is the only major shipping nation which
applies a rule of damages other than proportionate damages, and
since it is highly desirable in international law that all nations conform
to similar procedure and remedies in their courts of justice, it is to be
hoped that the Committee on Admiralty and the American Bar
Association will recognize the need of the more flexible rule of pro-
portionate negligence and will use their influence to effect adoption of
the rule.
III. THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LimLITY ACT
In fields other than admiralty, the common law doctrine of con-
tributory negligence has been found to be too harsh, and attempts
have been made to modify it. For instance, the Second Federal
Employers' Liability Act 14 provides that, in actions against inter-
state railroad carriers to recover damages for death or personal injury
to an employee, a recovery is not prevented by contributory negli-
gence. The statute adopts a system based on comparative negligence,
whereby the damages are t9 be diminished in the proportion which
the negligence of the employee bears to the combined negligence of
that employee and the defendant carrier; in other words, the carrier
is to be exonerated from a proportional part of the damages corre-
2143 5 STAT. 65, 66 (x9o8), as amended by 36 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-
59 (I926) [Used in conjunction with the FEDERAL SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT, 36
STAT. 298, 4 5 U. S. C § 16 (1926)]. In general, see 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-59 (notes); 8
FED. STAT. ANN. (2d ed.) 1344; 26 Cyc. 136o; 17 C. J. 1243; 39 ibid 818 et seq.
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sponding to the amount of negligence attributable to the employee."n
The language of the bill which was introduced in the New York
Assembly is so like that in the Federal Employers' Liability Act that
it seems obvious that the phrasing was taken from that Act."8 Since
the provisions of the Federal Act have been enforced in the courts for
a number of years, without any appreciable difficulty, without
noticeable increase of appeals, without too great a burden upon our
judges or too great a mental strain upon our juries, it is submitted
that an act like the New York bill should operate as easily, without
an increase of difficulties in trials, and with far greater justice and
fairness to the parties.
As was said of the Federal Employer's Liability Act in Southern
R. R. Co. v. Hill,'" "The statute contains three propositions which
stand out in bold relief; the first is, that a carrier is liable for the
injury or death of an employee resulting in part from the carrier's
negligence; secondly, the employee's contributory negligence does not
cut off the right of action; and thirdly, there is to be a diminution of
damages in proportion to the employee's negligence. It would seem
that the clear intent of Congress was to allow some damages for every
injury or death caused by the carrier's negligence; to adopt an ap-
proximation of the rile of the admiralty courts." It is, to be sure,
an approximation of the rule in admiralty, but the disadvantages
of the equal division of loss rule have been pointed out, and this so-
called "approximation" under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
is more just than the rule used in admiralty in the United States.
There is no necessity of finding the degree of negligence of the parties
in a case coming within the provisions of the Federal Employers'
"s35 STAT. 66 (i9o8), 45 U. S. C. § 53 (1926), "In all actions hereafter brought
against any such common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the
provisions of this chapter to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee,
or where such injuries have resulted in death, the fact that the employee may
have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the
damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to such employee: Prorided, that no such employee who may
be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in
any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted
for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee."
'"Note that the words "in all actions hereafter brought. . .to recover damages
for personal injuries.. .or where such injuries have resulted in death .... the fact
that the person injured [or employee] .. .may have been guilty of contributory
negligence... shall not bar a recovery, but [the] damages shall be diminished by
the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to [the person
injured]" are identical in both the FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT and the
proposed comparative negligence bill in New York.
17139 Ga. 549, 551, 77 S. E. 803, 804 (1913).
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Liability Act; all that is necessary is that the amount of negligence
of the carrier and the employee should be ascertained, and the dam-
ages will be apportioned according to that finding; the employee's
recovery will be reduced in proportion to the amount of default
attributable to him.
In Norfolk & Western Railway v. Earnesty 8 the court said, "[T]he
statutory direction that the diminution shall be 'in proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to such employ6' means,...
that, where the causal negligence is partly attributable to him and
partly to the carrier, he shall not recover full damages, but only a
proportional amount bearing the same relation to the full amount
as the negligence attributable to the carrier bears to the entire negli-
gence attributable to both; the purpose being to abrogate the common
law rule completely exonerating the carrier from liability in such a
case and to substitute a new rule confining the exoneration to a pro-
portional part of the damages corresponding to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the employ6."
In such cases, contributory negligence has no effect other than to
diminish the damages recoverable," 9 and it is only when the em-
ployee's act is the sole cause of the injury, the employer's act being no
part of the causation, that the employer is free from liability.' The
118229 U. S. II4, 122, 33 Sup. Ct. 654, 657, (i9i3); see ANN. CAs. 1914C, 172
(1913); infra note 119.
U9Supra notes II7, 118; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Tilghman, 237 U. S. 499,35
Sup. Ct. 653 (I915), rev'g, 167 N. C. 163, 83 S. E. 315, 1O9O (1914); Jackson v.
Rutledge, 188 Ind. 415, 122 N. E. 579 (i9g9); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton,
233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. 635 (i914), L. R. A. 1915C I, ANN. CAs. i 915B 475;
same case in 239 U. S. 595,36 Sup. Ct. i8O (I915); Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Carroll,
200 Ind. 589, 163 N. E. 99 (1929); Inge v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., x92 N. C.
522, 135 S. E. 522 (1926); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Jacobson, 218 Ala. 384, 118 So.
55 (1928); Grand T. W. Ry. v. Lindsay, 233 U. S. 42, 34 Sup. Ct. 58I (1914);
Kansas City S. Ry. v. Jones, 241 U. S. I8I, 36 Sup. Ct. 513 (I916); Atl. Coast
Line Ry. v. Russell, 215 Ala. 6oo, III So. 753 (1914); Beck v. B. & 0. R. R., 244
Ill. App. 441 (1927); Texas & P. R. R. v. Gibson, 281 S. W. 652 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926); Chadwick v. Ore-W. R. R., 74 Ore. 19, 144 Pac. xx65 (i914); Hocking
Valley R. R. v. Kontner, 114 Ohio St. 157, 15o N. E. 739 (1926); Louisville &
N. R. & L. Co. v. Beck, 196 Ind. 238, 147 N. E. 776 (1925); St. L. S. F. Ry. v.
Miller, 173 Ark. 597, 292 S. W. 986 (1927); Chicago M. St. P. & R. R. v. Kane,
33 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929); additional authority, see DEC. DIG. Negli-
gence, § ioi et seg., and Master & Servant, § 228 et seq; 45 U. S. C. p. 396 et seg.,
385, 386; 8 FED. STAT. ANN. 1344; 17 C. J. 1243, 39 C. J. 280 et seq.
120Meyers v. Ches., etc. R. R., 202 Ky. 443, 259 S. W. 1027 (1924); Hines v.
Sweeney, 28 Wyo. 57, 201 Pac, 165, 1018 (1921); Davis v. Payne, io8 Ore. 72,
216 Pac. 195 (1923); Pheasant v. Dir. Gen. R. R., 285 Fed. 342 (C. C. A. 3d,
1922); Fletcher v. S. Dakota Cent. R. R., 36 S. D. 4O, 155 N. W. 3 (1915);
Grand T. Ry. v. Lindsay, supra note 119; Dozier v. Mo. Pac. R. R., 3 S. W. (2d)
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question of comparative negligence does not arise when the negligence
consists in the violation of a federal statute, for in such cases the de-
fense of contributory negligence is entirely abrogated by a provision
of the Act.'2'
It is to be noticed that legislation forced the doctrine of com-
parative negligence into this employer-employee relationship. The
bill as originally framed in i9o6'12 differed considerably in form and
wording from the Act as finally adopted in that year. A battle as to
the constitutionality of the i9o6 Act ensued, and both because it
extended in terms to all common carriers engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce, and because it embraced subjects not within the
constitutional authority of Congress, it was declared invalid."'
The Act as refrained in i9o8 was held constitutional by a unanimous
court.Y4 From the date of inception of the second Federal Employers'
Liability Act,"' the courts were obliged to apportion damages in cases
of personal injury and death due to the mutual negligence of carrier
and employee, and state courts are bound by the opinion, con-
struction and interpretation of the Act by the Supreme Court. 12  So,
678 (Ark. 1928); Koofus v. Gt. N. Ry., 41 N. D. 176, 17o N. W. 859 (1918); Davis
v. Kennedy, 266 U. S. I47,45 Sup. Ct. 3 3 (1924); Unadilla V. Ry. v. Caldine, 278
U. S. 139, 49 Sup. Ct. 91 (1928); Bradley v. N. W. Pac. Ry., 44 F. (2d) 683 (C. C.
A. 9th, 193o); lengthy note (1931) 72 A. L. R. 1345, Comparative Negligence Rde
of Federal Employers' Liability Act as Supporting Recovery Where Injured Em-
ployee Participated in Violation of Order or Rule of Defendant.
"'Erie R. R. v. Schleenbaker, 257 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919), cert. den. 250
U. S. 666, 4o Sup. Ct. 13 (1919); Auslender v. Boettcher, 78 Colo. 427, 242 Pac.
672 (1926); Clark v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 318 Mo. 453,300 S. W. 758 (1927);
Carter v. St. L., T. & E. R. R., 307 Mo. 595, 271 S. W. 358 (1925); Grand Trunk
W. R. Co. v. Lindsay, 233 U. S. 42, 34 Sup. Ct. 581 (1914), ANN. CAS. 1914C
168; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Tilghman, supra note Ex5; Burho v. Minn. etc.,
R. Co., 121 Minn. 326, 141 N. W.3o (1913); St. Louis S. W. R. Co., v. Anderson,
117 Ark. 41, 173 S. W. 834 (1915); McAllister v. St. L. M. B. T. Ry., 25 S. W. (2d)
191 (Mo. 1930).
122FIRST EMPLOYERS' LIABLITY ACT was passed in 19o6, ch. 3073, 34 STAT.
232; SEcoND EMPLOYERS' L iBaiTy ACT of April 22, 19o8 (herein referred to as
"TheAct") was amendedApril 5, 1910, 36 STAT. 291, c. 143.
InDecision was five to four, Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup.
Ct. 141 (1907), aff'g, 148 Fed. 986 (W. D. Ky. 19o6).
umSecond Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. I, 32 Sup. Ct. 169,38 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 44 (1912), rev'g, 82 Conn. 373, 73 Atl. 762 (1912); see also Walker v. Iowa
Cent. R. R., 241 Fed. 395 (S. D. Iowa 1917); Bolch v. Chic. etc. R. R., go Wash.
47, 155 Pac. 422 (1916); Preble v. Union Stockyards Co., I O Neb. 383, x93 N. W.
910 (1923); Wallace v. N. Y. etc. R. R., 99 Conn. 4o4, 121 Atl. 878 (1917); St.
Louis, etc. R. IL v. Steel, 129 Ark. 520, 197 S. W. 288 (1917); see extensive list of
cases, 45 U. S. C. p. 105. "'Supra note 122.
'"Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra note 124.
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in this special field, the "common-law doctrine of contributory
negligence is abrogated in the interest of the employ6 and the doctrine
of comparative negligence substituted, which, pro tanto, encourages
care and diligence on the part of the employee."' 7
Since a state court cannot on the ground of inconvenience or con-
fusion refuse to enforce the remedy given by the Act,28 the subject
being clearly within the domain of Congress, the Act has been con-
sistently applied by both federal and state courts. In these appli-
cations there appears to have been no insuperable, or even con-
siderable, difficulty in determining the respective amounts of negli-
gence; the courts simply take it as a matter of course that they shall
as accurately as possible determine relative negligence and allocate
damages accordingly. Where a jury is used, the court must and does
instruct on the special provision"' of the Act, and juries apparently
have found no greater difficulty in determining the proportions in
which the parties were at fault. There has been no increase in appeals
because of the adoption of the rule. Both in admiralty and at com-
mon law, appellate courts refuse to upset the finding of the lower
courts on a question of fact such as this, where palpable error does not
clearly appear, and the fairness of allocating damages according to
the amount of fault seems not to be questioned. Since the doctrine
has worked with general satisfaction in these carrier cases, as evidenced
by the total lack of complaint about its operation, the fears and ar-
guments of the Committee on Admiralty in that field have less weight
than they would have without this practical and satisfactory test.
IV. THE MERCHANT MARINE (JONEs) ACT
The application of the Federal Employers' Liability Act"1 ' was
so eminently successful in both state and federal courts that Congress
in 1920 passed the Jones or Merchant Marine Act,"' which adopts
12tFulgham v. Midland V. R. Co., 167 Fed. 66o, 663 (W. D. Ark. 1909), rev'd, on
other grounds than negligence, 181 Fed. 91 (C. C. A. 8th, I91O).
"'Supra note 124; 17 C. J. 1189; 39 C. J. 823; Inge v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.
Co., supra note 119.
1"'Ilinois Cent. R. R. v. Nelson, 203 Fed. 956 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913); St. Louis-
S. F. Ry. v. Miller, 173 Ark. 597, 292 S. E. 986 (1927); Smithson v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. R. R., 174 Cal. 148, 162 Pac. i (1916); Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Farmers' T. & S. Co., z83 Ind. 287, IO8 N. E. io8 (1915); Pittsburgh etc., R. R. v.
Cole, 26oFed. 357(C. C. A. 6th, 1919), cert. den. 250 U. S. 671, 40 Sup. Ct. 15 (1919).
1"Supra note 114; see also supra notes 118-123, 129. Generally, on recovery of
seamen, see (1922) 36 HARV. L. REV. 777; (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 647; (1919) 53
AM. L. REv. 749; (I921) 55 Am. L. REv. 685.
...4I STAT. 988 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 861 et seq. (1926). The particular section
dealing with recovery for injury to or death of aseamanis 41 STAT.988, § 33 (1920),
as amending 35 STAT. rI8 5 (1915) (SEAMAN's Acr), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1926).
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the doctrine of comparative negligence in actions for damages brought
by seamen or their personal representatives against their employers
in injury or death cases. The provisions of the Jones Act bridge the
gap between the application of the rule of equal division of damages
in collision cases in the admiralty courts and the comparative negli-
gence doctrine applied in railroad employee-employer cases in the
common-law courts, in that the action, whether brought in common-
law courts, state or federal, or in admiralty, if it falls within the terms
of the statute, must be governed by the statute; the common-law
defense of contributory negligence is modified, and trial by jury in a
common-law court, with damages diminished according to the degree
of fault, is sanctioned. The Jones Act reads, "Any seaman who shall
suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his
election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of
personal injuries to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the
death of any seaman as a result of such personal injuries the personal
representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages
at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action, all statutes of
the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for
death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable." By
the generic reference to "all statutes of the United States modifying
or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal
injuries to railway employees", the Jones Act incorporates the
Federal Employers' Liability Act bodily, including of course Section
53, which provides for the rule of comparative negligence.'3 2
Lindgren v. United States,"' decided recently, sums up the operation
of the Jones Act in a well-considered paragraph, "[W]e conclude
that the Merchant Marine Act-adopted by Congress in the exercise
of its paramount authority in reference to the maritime law and in-
corporating in that law the provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act-establishes as a modification of the prior maritime law
a rule of general application in reference to the liability of the owners
of vessels for injuries to seamen extending territorially as far as
Congress can make it go; that this operates uniformly within all the
States and is as comprehensive of those instances in which it by
reference to the Federal Employers' Liability Act excludes liability,
as of those in which liability is imposed; and that, as it covers the
Inpanama R. R. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 44 Sup. Ct. 391 (1923); Engel v.
Davenport, 271U. S. 33, 46 Sup. Ct. 410 (1925); Lindgren v. United States, 281
U. S. 38, 50 Sup. Ct. 207 (i93o), aff'g, 28 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928).
"3Supra note 132, at 46, 50 Sup. Ct., at 211.
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entire field of liability for injuries to seamen, it is paramount and ex-
clusive, and supersedes the operation of all state statutes dealing with
that subject."
Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson,'" a pioneer case on the subject, held
that the statute is to be construed not as restricting enforcement
of the new rights to actions at law, but as allowing the injured sea-
man to sue either on the common-law side of the United States
District Court, with right of trial by jury, or on the admiralty side,
with trial to the court. Contributory negligence is only an element
in determining what the damages shall be.135 In Engel v. Daven-
port,'3 the court said, "having been brought after the passage of the
Merchant Marine Act, we think that the petitioner, instead of in-
yoking, as he might, the relief accorded him by the old maritime
rules, has elected to seek that provided by the new rules in an action
at law based on negligence-in which he not only assumes the burden
of proving negligence, but also, under Section 3 of the Employers'
Liability Act, subjects himself to a reduction of damages in pro-
portion to any contributory negligence on his part.'1i7 Any suit
brought under the Merchant Marine Act, regardless of the forum or
of local statutes bearing upon the subject, must be governed by
provisions of the Act.13 8
mSupra note 132. See also Nelson Co. v. Curtis, I F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 9th,
1924) rezug, 294 Fed. 926 (N. D. Cal. 1924); and cf. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.
S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 38 Sup. Ct. 5O1 (1918); Engel v. Davenport, supra note 132.
135Lloyd v. T. Hogan & Sons, 128 Misc. 665, 219 N. Y. Supp. 750 (1927); The
Henry S. Grove, 22 F. (2d) 444 (D. Md. 1927); Russell v. Pere Marquette Ry.,
245 Mich. 624, 223 N. W. 230 (1929), cert. den. 279 U. S. 864, 49 Sup. Ct. 480
(1929); Blosky v. Overseas Shipping Co., 219 App. Div. 438, 220 N. Y. Supp. 95
(1927); Messel v. Foundation CO., 274 U. S. 427, 47 Sup. Ct. 695 (1927); Grim-
berg v. Admiral Oriental S. S. Line, 3oo Fed. 619 (W. D. Wash. 1924); Hammond
Lumber Co. v. Sandin, 17 F (2d) 76o C. C. A. 9th, 1927, cert. den. 274 U. S. 756,47
Sup. Ct. 767 (1927); The Salmon King, 31 F. (2d) 1004 (W. D. Wash. 1929);
cases supra note 132.
l3 Supra note 132. The UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT points out, at p. 37,
that where action is brought in the state court, and local state law would bar the
cause of action, "It is clear that the state courts have jurisdiction concurrently
with the federal courts, to enforce the right of action established by the Merchant
Marine Act as a part of the maritime law," and such suits are governed by the
federal acts rather than by state law. "37Supra notes 119-129.
naLindgren v. United States, supra note 132; Second Employers' Liability
Cases, supra note 124; Patrone v. Howlett, 237 N. Y. 394, 143 N. E. 232 (1924);
Northern Coal Co. v. Strand, 278 U. S. 142,49 Sup. Ct. 88 (1928); Erie R. R. v.
Winfield, 244 U. S. 170,37 Sup. Ct. 556 (1916); New York Central R. R. v. Win-
field, 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546 (1916). Since the MERCHANT MARINE ACT
by reference incorporates the provisions of and the interpretation of THE FEDERAL
EmPLomRs' LIABILITY ACT, the railroad cases above are applicable.
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It is to be noted that the Federal Employers' Liability Act was in
constant use for some twelve years before the passing of the Jones
Act.139 Every presumption is in favor of both the practicability and
desirability of the former, since its terms were incorporated bodily
into the latter.140 Therefore, as the section modifying the common-
law defense of contributory negligence was one of the outstanding
provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, its re-enactment
amounts to a legislative declaration of satisfaction in the operation
of that rule. Certain it is that no affirmative argument has been
voiced against the adoption of the doctrine on grounds of an increase
in appeals, arising from uncertainty in allocating respective degrees of
fault, nor has litigation itself been increased. Apparently trial
judges are having no difficulty in allocating the fault in various cases.
(To be concluded in the June issue)
u9The reference is to the SECOND EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT, supra note 114;
cf. supra notes 122, 123, 125.
"
0Congress passed, March. 4, 1927, THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT, 44 STAT. 1424, 33 U. S. C. §§ 90r-950 (1931
Supp.), to provide "compensation to employees engaged in maritime employment,
except as stated, for disability or death resulting from injury occurring on navi-
gable waters of the United States where recovery through workmen's compen-
sation proceedings might not validly be provided by state law. Employers are
bound to secure the payment of the prescribed benefits to those of their em-
ployees whose employment is covered by the act, and this compensation is to be
payable irrespective of fault as a cause of the injury." Noguiera v. N.Y. N.H. &
H. R. R., 281 U. S. 128, 13i, 5o Sup. Ct. 303 (i93o), aff'g, 32 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A.
2d, 1930). "The Merchant Marine Act is not repealed by this more recent en-
actment. The former still embraces employees that the latter does not, as witness
the section 902 (3) of the latter which excludes 'a master or member of a crew of
any vessel', and 'any person engaged by the master to load, unload or repair any
small vessel under eighteen tons net', (citing the Noguiera case supra) ... The Act
expressly provides that liability thereunder 'shall be exclusive and in place of
all other liability of such employer to the employee or his personal represen-
tative... at law or in admiralty." Obrecht-Lynch Corp. v. Clark, 3o F. (2d) 144
(D. Md. 1929). Cf. The Pacific Pine, 31 F. (2d) 152 (W. D. Wash. 1929) and 33
U. S. C. § 905 (1931 Supp.) (44 STAT. 1426) for provision as to exclusiveness
of suit. State law, such as state workmen's compensation acts, conflicting with
maritime law, is inapplicable in a suit in personam under the JoNES' ACT, Mer-
chants' & Miners' Transp. Co. v. Norton, 32 F. (2d) 513 (E. D. Pa. 1929), as is
also the FEDERAL EMPLOYERs'LIABILITY ACT, Noguiera v. N. Y., N. H. & H.
R. R., supra. In Hunt v. Bank Line Ltd., 35 F. (2d) 137 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929), an
employee who had accepted compensation under the HARBOR WORERS' COM-
PENSATION ACT asked his employer to sue the steamship line for damages for
negligent injuries. The employer refused to sue and the workman attempted to
bring suit in his own name. Held, he could not maintain the action, acceptance
of compensation being an election not to sue for damages. And see Robinson,
PersonalInjuryin tlhe Maritime Industry (1930) 44HARv. L.R Ev. 223, at 239 et $e.
